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T30l~/\AS

Federal/civil Timely

VIT .T.i\G E OF P8T.LE

1.

TEL~RE

Appellees, three of six unrelated students

living together in a house located in
of Belle Terre (Long

Island~

tm

Village

sought declaratory

and injunctive relief in the E.D.N.Y. (Dooling)
against the application of a local zoning ordinance.

*

.)

Rehearing en bane was denied .4-4 (Friendly,
Bays, l'lulligan, Timbers diss). The opi.nd.on
of the oriBinal ranel remanded · th~ ciase to the
t).Ct for additional fact finding. After neither
party chose to supplement the record the D.Ct.
entered jurlgment in accordance with the CA 2
opinion and on appe nl from this judgr]l(~ n t anothe r
panel of Ci\ 2 (Friendly, llays; Jar.l ~ son,D.J.) surm narily
affirmed without opinion on 5/l/73. Technically,
it is from thn 5/1 /7 3 CA 2 judgment tb;lt: the appea 1
h::~~

hr>r>n

t · r~l<r>n.

-2-

The ordinanc e limited

~es idency

to one-family

units with "family" being defined as a bloodrelated unit or a maximum of two unrelated
individuals.

The D.Ct. denied re lief. un

appeal, CA. 2 reversed,findin e, that arpellants,
the Village and its Trustees, had failed to
demonstrate that the classification in the
ordinance was substantially related to the
object of. the statute.

Rehearing en bane

was denied 4-4.
2. FACTS:

Appellees, Edwin and Judith Dickman

owned a six-bedroom .home in the village of Belle
Terre, a suburb in Suffolk County, Long Island
\.J

with approximately 700 residents and 220 homes.
The home has been rented to appellees, Boraas, Parish
and Trwnan (and three others not a party) all of whom
are students at the State Univ at Stony Brook, located
some 7-8 miles away.

None of the 6 are related,

(one is a female), however they attempt to function
as a "family" by sharing the facilities and the

------------------The village is zoned

c.hor~s.

exclusively for (one-

l'

family dwellings and an -' ordinance 12f]_f'es "family" as:
"One or more persons related by blood, adoption
or marriage, living and cooking together as a
single housekeeping unit, exclusive of servants.
A number of persons but not exceeding two (2)
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood,
adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family."
A violation of the ord. subjects the offender to
a fine of $100/day and 60 days ' imprisonment/day.

-3-

On June 8, 1972, two of the appellees, Boraas
and Truman \vere denied r·esidents' beach passes
because the ordinance allegedly considered them
"illei.jn l t:'f:?sidents,"

On Ju1y 31, 1972 the:! Dickmr.ins

were served with rn "Order to Remedy Violations"
which notified
th~

~ppellees

· that failure to remedy

condition. might subject them to liability

commencing Aug 3, 1972,
On Aug 2, 1972 appel lees comenccd this §1983
action in the E.D.N.Y. seeking an injunction against
the enforcement of the ordinance an:l a declaratory
judgment invalidating the ordinance as unconstitutional
under the 14th Am.

On Sept 20, 1972 Judge Dooling

issued a 40 page opinion upholding the validity
of the ordinance and denying relief.

Specifically,

Judge Dooling found that the ordinance could not
be upheld on traditional grounds supporting zoning
regulations

(~,

safety, municipal services,conges-

tion) but that the ordinance was sustainable as a
lawful exercise of a "legally protectable

aff~e

'-------------------------------------------

interest" in maintaining "traditional" family units

------------------------------------

in the community.

-~-----Decislon Below.

On appeal CA 2 reversed with

Judge Timbers dissenting.
rejected

appellants~

As did the D. Ct 1 CA .2

··

-

procedural defenses (3-Judge;

Youneer v. llarris; justiciability; §2283; abstention),
and none of these defenses is raised in this appnal.

On the merit s , Judge Mansfield invalidat e d the
ordinanc e applying an equal protection standard
that was admittedly somewhere between the
rational basis and comp el ling state

intere~t

tests.:
"the test~ .•• i.s wJv,Uwr t he 1 egis l a t ive
classification is Jn fa ct substantially
related to the object-~the statute ...
If the classificat ion, upon review of
facts bearing upon the foregoing relevant
factors, is shown to have a substantial
relation to a lawful objective ••• it will
be upheld. If not, it denies equal
protect ion." (16a Cert pet).
Numerous recent Sup Ct cases were cited by
Judge

~iansfield

to support his conclusion

that the Ct was moving av..rP..y from a rigid
two-tiered approach to equal protection,
"toward a more f1 ~ible and equitable approach
'""h·ich perrni'fSCOn si.eJct·ation l:o be given to
evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under attack, the n~ture of the rights
adversely affected, and the governmental interest
urged in support of it. " (16a)
Citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 446; Reed v.
Reed, 404

u.s.

71; and others.

Applying this standard, Judge Mansfield
co~oluded

that the ordinance operated to "impose

the social preferences" of the Community
II

to the derfogation of the .___
ri ght .

(admitt e dly not

"fundamenta't') of unmarried sroups to live togethe r

~
Jl
,,

~bY-

where they choose. If in fact there were legitimate
objectives sought by the ordinance (Q..W;.. congestion,

.~.

-5-

noise) they could be acihieved more narrowly throueh
ordinances specifically aimed at the evil.
"Even if the Belle Terre ordinance could
conceivably have a legitimate zoning objective,
the classification established, may well be
vulnerable as too sweeping, excessive and over
inclusive." (22a)
The Ct concluded that the classification in
the ordinance "does not appear to be supported
by any rational basis that is consistent with
permissible zoning objectives" and remanded
the rase to the D.Ct to give appellants an
opportunity to develop facts under the standard
articulated by Judge Mansfield.
(

...

Judge Timbers dissented.

Wfiile he agreed

that the Sup Ct has moved away from a rigid twotiered equal protection approach, he disagreed
with the standard applied by the majority.

Under

Jud ge Timbers reading of the cases, "a legislature
should be able to adopt any means that are reasonably
effective in achieving a valid legislative end or
ends." (p33a)

Applying this standard the dissent

would have upheld the ordinance finding that the
ordinance was reasonably related to several
legitimate objectives: maintenance of the traditional
'

family character, control of population density 1

.

avoidance of

~t

escaJ~ng

rents, and prevention of

parking, traffic and noise problems.

Judge Timbers

I

-6-

concluded:
"The fact thrrt the means selected by the
Vi 11 a co may not have been Lhe 1nos t efficient
or the lea s t int rns i_ve of those available is
legally immmatcrial under the means-scrutiny
test. If the merrns selected contributes
substantially to the end, the crJual protection
c J r:tuse fias- not been v io J.,, ted, It is not:
ou~u to ~e in such intens e revie\v
of legislation unless the classification is
suspect or a fundamental intere ~~ is adversely
affected," (40a)

~~

Judge Timbers wrote an opinion dissenting
to the denial of rehearing en bane in which
he stat.:ed that the majority· s opinion was
inconsistent with the equal protection standard
enunciated in Rodriguez. Jud ge
a reply,

~~ nsfi el d

wrote

Al) p<-J l'c nt ly both of these opinions

spoke only for the author,
On
to

ren~nd

suppl(~ment

to the n.Ct, n6ither party cho se
the· origina l record and the D. Ct

C-'!ntered juclgJHe nt decl;.:U:-1.ng t::1e ordinance invalid
insofar as it proscribes

resident~

more than two persons not related.

occupancy by
CA 2 (Friendly,

Hays, Jameson) affirmed summarily without opinion.
3.CONTENTIONS. Appant

argues that the ordinance was

a legitimate exercise of the traditional zoning
power and can be justified on traditional grounds
such as densi t y cnntrol·as
well as on the ground
I
that it

fustf-~rs

the existence of a sheltered, stable

and tranquil family environment .

The aflf)roach

of CA 2 undermines the power and ab i 1 i ty of loca 1
gov•t to enact many forms of zoning ordinances
/

-7-

(
desiened tto control density and presRrve the
Cl

The size of~family

neighborhood character.

is inherently seJf-J illli:tinp.; Rnd an ordinance
placing nun:crical rcstricLions on non -farnily
residc~nccs

is clearly legiLimate.

"The question

before the Ct is not ·,,.hether the lawmakers can
prove the factual hasis underlying the statute;
but whether the challenger can demonstrate "that
such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonahle."

,EtlCJ j rl y ,, /1mltl . . . r EeRJ t::y

j .. ,.. .,:.~ •. ~.- ........

In their

... -.~ ....

''Iii.<.

~iot

. ..-...... !;) •. ...,_, .•.,..

i.on to

--~·~···,

1\ f

._ .............. _

finn, Appe llces ,rely

ent in~ ly on the CA 2 opinion and this Ct' s recent
(
I
.
"·-

decision in U.S. Dept of Agric v. Moreno , 41 USLW
I

5105 (June 25, 1973)(5-L,,

POivell,

B!:.'.b.~<JUist

nn DW"r<dmc nt

~:o

ChU~f

Justice,

Bl.a~_l<.mun,

dis) in Hhich the Ct invalidated

th? Food Sto.mp Act 1·1h i.ch generally

excluded frou; pc.: ...: tictpation in the food stamp program
any household containing an individual who was unrelated
to any other household member.

The Ct

purpo~tedly

applied a "rational basis" test in that case and
held that there was no rational basis.

4. Discussion.

Under the pure "old" rational basis

test, it seems fairly clear that the ordinance is
legitimate.

It also seems clear

~hat

under a stricter

"narrower means" type standard, the ordinance could
'--.. )

be more narrowly drawn to directly confront the
asserted evils.

Q\

2 appears to be challenging

the Ct to either explicitly articulate the multi-level

•,

-8-

test suggested in cases such as Reed and Eisenstadt.
Although the hybrid equal protection tests articulated

t.
1

by the majority and dissent below do not sound

!

all that different,

~s

L

applied, the majority's

standard approaches a "st:cict "level of scrutiny
whereas the dissent seems quite close to a pure
rational basis approach.

The question of what level

of scrutiny to apply in equal protection zoning cases
is obviously a significant one and one that has

no~t

been faced by the Ct since Euclid in 1926, which
was well bef ore the full blossoming of equal protection.
The question of whether "preserving the traditional
family structure" is a legitimate zonirg objective
seems central to the case and eo a large degree
'

the difference in the opinions below revolve
around· that issue.

Moreno suggests that preserva-

tion of the traditional family might not be a
legitimate governmental interest · in some ·instances,
however, the context within which the issue arises
~

J

here is sommi'hat different.
Although ·this type of "blood-family" ordinance
is probabl y quite common (its prevalence is not
discussed by the parties) this is the first CA
case to pass on its validity.

Two state Supreme

Cts have invalidated similar provisions, City of
Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d

..

'

-9-

116 (1966); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of 1'-ianasgQillJ, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971), and one
D.Ct. has upheld a similar ordinance, Palo Alto
Tr->n_~P.!JL...l.L'li-_QQ.• --Y.:..~ .~OTf/ln,

1970).

321 F.S11pp 908 (N.D. Cal.,

The absence of a substantial conflict

would seem to militate against@ at this time.
There is a
9/25/73

CA2 and D.Ct ops in app to
Juris. St.

./

of the author of the
cert pool memo that it would be wise not to take this case.
The Court should wait until a substantial conflict develops,
although CA2's decision is a controversial equal protection
holding.

However, this is

Where a federal CA

o~erturns

an appeal, not a cert.
a state statute (which includes

a local ordinance for the purposes of the relevant jurisdictional statute, 28 USC 1254(2)) on constitutional grounds,
an appeal lies from the CA to this Court.

This is one of

those rare cases where appeal rather than cert is the
relevant linkage between

· s--eourt.

Since this• is an appeal, the normal practice, if the

-2-

affirm summarily.

(Affirm summarily is correct, rather than

to dismiss for want of a substantial federal question, as this
easel

$

com~from

a federal court.)

However, technically speaking,

a summary affirmance is a decision on the merits, although
most people pay no attention to

+~·+·

My point is simply

that it would be easier not to take this case (to avoid
CA2's "challenge," in the words of the attached memo) if it
were a cert and not an appeal.
Nevertheless, I would affirm summarily.

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

John C. Jeffries, Jr.

DATE: February 15, 1974

No. 73-191 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas
In my view this is a relatively straightforward equal protection
case that should cause you little difficulty.

The CA majority invalidated

this ordinance on the basis of avowedly middle-tier equal protection "a more flexible and equitable approach, which permits consideration
to be given to evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under
attack, the nature of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental
interest urged in support of it." J. S. App., at 16a. As I read your
Rodriguez opinion, it rejects this free-wheeling inquiry into the wisdom
or desirability of legislation in favor of a more structured approach to
equal protection analysis. Assuming for the moment that this case
involves no fundamental right, Rodriguez seems to "'!llne to require evaluation
of the challenged ordinance under the relaxed standard of review traditionally
termed the rational basis test. (As I have indicated on other occasions,
I do not believe this means a return to McGowan v. Maryland, which I
regard as an abdication of the search for rationality.) Application of
that standard to this case is the basis for my recommendation that you
vote to reverse the judgment below.

2.
I do not believe that the town need search for such collateral
objectives of the zoning ordinance as the probable reduction of the
number of automobiles and indirect control of population density, though
it is by no means clear that such considerations do not furnish a rational
basis in this case. In my

vi~w,

the attempt to preserve the family character

of the village is quite legitimate. I have no doubt that groups of single
people living together characteristically behave differently than do married
persons. At least that sort of assumption seems valid in communities with
substantial student populations.

Although I would not, as a legislator, favor

the restriction here imposed by the village, I see no constitutional obstacle
to i zoning ordinance designed to further the community interest in
J...

maintaining its present character.

Additionally, you should notAthat the

kind of differentiation made here between families and groups of unrelated
people is quite widespread and exists in state and local legislation
regarding zoning, taxing, estate and inheritance laws, public and state
university housing, etc.
At pp. 60 ff. of their brief, appellees contend that the Belle Terre

ordinance imposes a burden on constitutionally fundamental rights and
is therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.
To me this argument is unpersuasive, undoubtedly in part because the
two "fundamental" rights that are allegedly abridged are not among my
favorites.

Appellees first avenue to strict scrutiny is the right to travel.

In my view this ordinance has nothing to do with the right to travel.

It

3.
does not restrict or prohibit movement nor does it place those who move
into a given area under any restrictions different from those applied to
long-term residents. I think appellants are right in suggesting that if
this ordinance is a burden on the right to travel, then every law or
regulation that prohibits a certain activity that is legal in some other
place must fall.
Appellees, however, seek to avoid the force of this argument by
contending that the Belle Terre ordinance puts to them a Hobson!."S choice
between fundamental rights - either they must forego the "right" to settle
in Belle Terre or they must abandon their "right" to live with whomever
they please in whatever circumstance they desire. This is assertedly
one aspect of the right to privacy. To my mind this pyramiding of
interests is misleading and unhelpful. Either they have a constitutionally
protected right to live in a group of six unrelated persons or they do not.
In my view their assertion is no more and no less than an invitation to the

Court to engage in another round of substantive due process on behalf of
a reasonably trivial personal interest.
JCJ jr

ss

J

MEMORANDUM

Juslice Powell

TO:

In my view this is a relatively straightforward equal prdectlon

case that should cause you little difficulty.. The CA
majority invalidated
s
this ordinance on the basis of avowedly middle-tier equal protection j

l

''a more flexible .and equitable approach, which permits consideration

to be given to evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under
'-~::

U··

attack, the nature of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental
'

interest urged in support of it." J. S. App., at 16a. As I read your
Rodriguez opinion, it rejects this free-wheeling inquiry into the wisdom
or desirability of legislation in favor of a more structured approach to
'equal protection analysis. Assuming for the moment that this case
involves no fundamental right, Rodriguez seems to~ to require evaluation
;,l

?f the challenged ordinance under the relaxed standard of review traditionally
termed the rational basts test. EtAs I have indicated on other occasions,
I

I do not believe this
means a return to McGowan v. Maryland, which I
.
'l'J" -

,,•._,

•

regard as an abdicatloo of the search for rtl.ticmaltty.) Application of
that standard to this case is the basis for my recommendatioo that you
vde to reverse the judganent below.

' ,,

'

•

2.
, I do not believe that the town need search for such collateral
objectives of the zoning ordinance as the probable reduction of the
number of automobiles and Indirect control of population density, though
it is by no means clear that aueh emsiderations do not fumish a ·#&tional
basts In this ease. In my view, the attempt to preserve the family character
of the village is quite legitimate. I hue no doult that groups of single
people living together eharacteristieally behave differently than do married
., persorui~i~,', ,At least that sort of assumption seems valid In communities with

substantial student populations. Although I would not, as a legislator, favor
the restriction here imposed by the village, I aee no constitutional obstacle
,~ to azonlng ordinance designed to further the community Interest In
'·£~,

maintaining Jts present character. Additlcmally, you should n« that the
,kind of dUferentiatlon made here between families and groups of unrelated
people is quite widespread and exists In state and local legislation

regarding zmlng, taxing, estate and Inheritance laws, public and state

i

university housing, etc.
, ;At :, pp. 60 ff. of their brief, appellees contend that the Belle Terre
ordinance imposes a burden on e anstitutionally fundamental rights and

,tS 't herefore subject to atrtct scrutiny under the equal pr«ectton elauae.
'•
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To me this argument 1s unpersuasive, undoultedly In part because the
' "ttwo "fundamental'' rights that are allegedly abridged are not among my
favorites. Appellees first avenue to strict lll::rut lny is the rlgbt to traveL
In my view this ordinance has n«hlng to do with thE( right to travel. It

3.

does not restrict or prohibit movement nor does it place those who move
into a given area under any restrictions different from those applied to
long-term residents. I think appellants are right In suggesting that 1f
this ordinance is a burden on the right to travel, then every law or :.
regulation that prohibits ,.a certain activity
that .is legal in some other
' v .
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Appellees, however, seek to avoid the force of this argument by
contending that the Belle Terre ordinance puts to thelll: a Hobscm.Je choice
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Village of Belle Terre On Appeal from theReoiroulated:
United States .,___ _ _ _ _ __
et al. , Appellants.
Court of Appeals for the Secv.
ond Circuit.
Bruce Boraas et al.
fMarch -, 1974]
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Belle Terre is a village on Long Island 's north shore
of about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people. Its total
land area is less than one square mile. It has restricted
land use to one-family dwellings excluding lodging
houses, boarding houses. fraternity houses. or multiple
dwelling houses. The word "Farnily" as used in the
ordinance means, "One or more persons related by blood ,
adoption , or marriage, living and cooking together as a
single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2)
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit
though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall
be deemed to coustitute a family."
Appellees (Dickmans) are owners of a house in the
village and leased it in December. 1971 for a term of 18
months to Michael Truman . Later Bruce Boraas became a colessee. Then Anne Parish moved into the
house along with three others. These six are students
at nearby State University at Stony Brook and none is
related to the other by blood , adoption, or marriage.
When the village serv('d the Dickmans with an "Order to

'i3-191-0Pl:\IO, ~
~

YILLAC:E O.F HELLE TEHHE

1•.

BOHAAS

Remedy Yiolations" of the ordinance.' the owne'rs plus
three tt'JJants ~ thereupo11 brought this action under
42 1'. ~. C. ~ Hl83 for an injunction (kclaring the ordinance' unconstitutional. The District Court lwld thc:>
ordinance unconstitutional ::111d the ( 'ourt of Appeals
affirn1Pd. OJH' judge dissenting. 47() F. :2d HOG. Tlw case'
is here by ap]weal. 2R P. S. C. ~ 12,154( 2); and \\·e' noted
probable- jurisdiction. 414 lT. :->. 007.
This rase hri11gs to this Court a diff<•rcnt phase'
of lo<·al "oning rc•gulation~ than \\'(' havP pn•viously
revievn•cl. Euclid \' .• I 111/Jler /(('(1/ly C'o., '272 l ' . :->. :3ti5.
involved a zoning onlinaJJCe• e·lassifying land use in a
given area into six catc:>gories. AppPllPe•'::; tract::; fc:>ll
under thrrc:> classifications: l'- 2 that included twofamily dwellings; P-:3 that includPd apartments, hotels.
churclws. schools. privatP clubs. hospitals, city hall and
the like; and P - (i included sewagP disposal plants. incinerators, scrap storage. cetne•tcries. oil and gas storage and
so on. Heights of buildings were pr<'scribc:>d for each
zone; also tlw sizr of land arras rrquired for e'ach kind
of use was sprcified. Til<' land in litigation was vacant
and bc:>i ng held for indus trial dc-•velopHH:'nt; and <'vidence
was introduced showing that under tlH' rc:>stricted use
ordinance tlH' la1HI wonld be greatly reduced in value.
The claitn was that the' land OWll<'l' was being deprived
of librrty and property without duP process withi11 the
meaning of the Fourtcc~nth Amendment.
, .. 1/arrilf. -!01 \' . S. :~7. i~ not involwd lu•re a:> ou
Aug. 2, 197:2, when thi~ fec!Pral ~nit wa~ mitiated, no :il<l1<' c•:t~c· had
bC'Pn ~~art Nl. ThP rffpct of the' "OrdPr to Rf'nwdy Violation~" wn<~
io ~uhjf'et thr ocettpnnt~ to linbilit_,. commrneing Augu~t :~. 197:2.
During the' litigation thr 1Pii~P c•xpirf'd and 1t wa~ !'Xt(')ldrd . Antw
J'ari~h moved out. TlwrPaftn thr othC'r fivr ~tudC'nl~ Jrft and the
ownn,.: now hold the' home· out for ~air or rC'nt , including lo,
::;tudrnt group:::.
2 Truman, BoraaH, and Pari~h heranw appt>ll(> t>~ hut not tlw othrr
lhwc.
1 }'uwl(ll'l'
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'rhe Court sustained thr zoning ordinance under the
police power of the State. saying that the line "which
in this field separates tlw legitimate from the illegitimate
assumption of pov,:er is not capabiP of precise delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions.''
272 F. S .. at 387. Anti thE:' Court added "A nuisance
may be merely a right thing in thr wro11g place.-like
a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. If the
validity of thr le~islatlvc classiflcatie)ll for <~bnin~ put'·
poses be fairly d('batablc. thr legislative judgment must
be allowed to control.'' !d., at :388. ThP Court listed as
COIISiderations beal'ing Ol~ th(\ COIIStituti<)llality of Wiling
ordinances tlw dangc>r of fire~ or collapl"c of buildings, the
evils of over-crowding people. aud thE' possibility that
"offensive trades, i nd ustr.i('S. and structures" might
"create nuisanc(:·• to n~sidential sf.ctions. Ibid . But
even those historic police po>ver problems need not loom
large or actually be existent i11 a given casr. For the
exclusion of "all industrial establishments" does not mean
that "only offensive or dangerous industries will be excluded ." Ibid. That fact does not invalidate the ordinance, the Court held :
"The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure
effective enforcement. will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the F~tamp of invalidity . Such laws may
also find their justification j n the fact that, ill some
fields. the bad fades into the good by such insensible rlegrees that the two are not capable of being
readily clisti nguished and separated iu terms of
legislation." ld., 388- 389.
The main thrust of th€' case in the mind of the Court
was in the exclusion of industries and apartments and as
respects that it commented on the desire to keep residential areas free of "disturbing noises" ; "increased
traffic"; the hazard of "movillg and parked automobiles" ;
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tho ''depriving children of the privilege of quiet and
OJWn spaces for play. enjoyed by thos(' in more favored
localities. " Jd., at :3D4. The ordinance was sanctioned
b('cause the validity of th(' legislative classification was
"fairly debatable" and therefore could not be said to be
wholly arbitrary. !d., at '388.
Our decision in Bermau "· Parker, 34tl P. S. 26. sus~
taint-d a land use project in tlw District of Columbia
against a land own0r's claim that the takiug violated the
Dur Process Clause and tlw Just Colltpensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. TJ1e essence of the argument
against the law was. while taking property for ridding
an area of slums was permissible. taking it "merely to
develop a better balanced, more attractive community"
was not. 348 r. S., at 31. We refused to limit the concept of public welfare that may be enhauced by zoning
regulations." We said:

;.

"Miserable and clisruptable housing conditions may
do more than spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle.
They may indePd makr living an almost unsufferable
l>urden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight
on the community which robs it of charm, which
makes it a placr from which men tum. The misery
" \'0rmonf ha:< enncted c·omJll'C'Iwn~ive :statrwidc htnd ns<' rontrol~
whirh dirPC't lora! board:; to Cl0velop plan~ ordering tlH• n:scs of locnl
lnnd intel' alia. to ·'create• conditionH favorable to tran~portation ,
lwalth. ":tfPt~·, civic aefivitie::< am! educational and cnltmal opportun\1 iP:<. I and] n·duer the wa~tp~ of financial and human rrsourrc~
which r<'~ult from rit hrr cxe<'::;~ivr ronge~1 ion or exct•so;ivr srn t tering
of popul<ttion .. . . " 10 Vermont Stat. Allll. § ()042 (1971 Supp.).
FPdrml l<'~~:i~lation ha~ bePn propo~ed dP:;ign<'d to assist State:; and
locnlitir~ in cl<•vPloping such broad objec1ivr land 11~r guidPlines.
SeP S. C'omm. on IntNior and Tn~ulnr Affair~, Land U:;e Policy and
Planning A~~i~tance Art , S. H<'p . No . g3-197,, 9;3d Cong., l~t Se~8 .

(197;3) .

,....

73-191-0PINION
VILLAGE OF BELLE TEHHE v. BOHAAS

5

of housing may despoil a community as au open
.
.
sewer may rum a n ver.
"We do not sit to determine whether a particular
housing project is or is not desirable. The concept
of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .. ..
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within
the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as wf'll as clean, '-':ell-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled." !d., 32- 33.

If the ordinance segregated one area only for one race,

it would immediately be suspect under the reasoning of
Buchanan v. vl'arley, 245 e. ::->. 60, where the Court
invalidated a city ordinance barring a Black from acquiring real property in a white residential area by reason of
an 1866 Act of Congress, 14 Stat. 27 , 42 U. S. C. ~ 198i
and an 1870 Act. 16 Stat. 144, both enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. !d., 78- 82. See Jones v. Mayer
Co., 392 P . S. 409.
In Seattle Trust Cu. v. Roberge, :278 U. S. 116, Seattle
had a zoning; orcliuance that permitted a "philanthropic
hom<' for children or for olti people" in a particular district
"when the written cotlsent shall have beeu obtained of
the owners of two thirds of the property within four
hundred feet of the proposexl building." !d., at 118.
The Court held that provision of the ordinance unconstitutional saying that the existing owners could "withhold
consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily , and may subject
the trustee lowner I to th eir will or caprice." !d. , at 122.
Unlike the billboard cases (Cusack Co . v. City of Chicago,
242 U. S. 526) . the Court concluded that th e Seattle ordinance was invalid since tl1C' proposed home for the aged
i)oor was not shown by its maintenance• and construction
"to work any injury, inconveniencC'. or annoyancP to the.
community, the district or any persou ." I d., at 122.
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The present ordinance is challenged on several grounds:
that it interferes with a person 's right to travel; that it
interferes with the right to migrate to and settle within a
State; that it bars people who are uncongenial to the
present residents: that the ordinance expresses the social
preferences of the residents for groups that will be congenial to them; that social homogenity is not a legitimate
interest of government; that the restriction of those
whom the neighbors do not like trenches on the newcomer's rights of privacy; that it is of no rightful concern
to villagers whether the residents are married or unmarried; that the ordinance is antithetical to the Nation 's
experience, ideology and self-perception as an open,
egalitarian. and integra ted society '
We find none of these reasons in the record before us.
It is not aimed at transients. C'f. Shapiro v. Tho111pson ,
394 P. S. 618. It involves no procedural disparity
inflicted on some but not on others such as was presented
by Griffin "· Illinois, 351 U. S. 12. It involves no "fundamental" right guaranteed by the Constitution. such as
voting, Harper v. Viryinia Board, 383 U . S. ()63; th e right
of association. XAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449; the
right of access to the courts, .\"AACP v. Button, :371 P . S.
415; or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 l T. S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438.
We deal with economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically drawn lines which we respect
against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection
Clause "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it," M eGo wan " · Maryland , 366 P . S. 420, 425~
426; Reed v. R eed, 404 P. S. 71. 76.
It is said , however, that if two unmarried people can
constitute a "family," there is no reason why three or

•.

'~lnny refPrrnrp,.; in tlw dewlopmmt of tlliH th r,.;i~ arP made to
TurnPr , Thr Frontier in Amrrirnn Hi,.;tor~· ( 1!-!20) , with rmpha,.;t><
on hi>< theory that "dm10eraey i ~ born of fn·r land ." /d ., :32.

.'
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four may not. But every line drawn by a legislature
leaves some out that might well hav<' been included.''
That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative not
a judicial function .
1t is said that the Belle Terre ordinance reeks with an
animosity to unmarried couples who live together.
There is no evidence to support it; and the provisiou of
the ordinance bringing within the definition of ll "familyH
two unmarried people belies the charge.
· The ordinance places no ban on freedonl of assoeiatiotl,
for a "family" may, so far as the ordinaiJetl is cOncemed.
!:ntertain whomever they lik<~.
The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses. a11d
the like present urban problems. More people occupy a
given space; more cars ratlwr continuously pass by ; mon•
cars are parked; noise travels with crowd s.
A quiet placf' \Vherf' yards an:• wide , people fe\\' . and
motor vehicles restricted ar<' legitima.t e guidelines in a
land use project addressf'd to fantily needs. This goal is
a permissiblf' one within Berman \ . Parker, s·upra. The
police power is not confined to elimination of filth . stench,
and unhealthy places. lt is ample to lay out zones where
family values. youth values, and the blessings of quiet
sec) usion, and clean air make tht> area a sanctuary for
people.

H eversed.

" 1\fr . .Tu~tic<' Holme~ madr tlw point a h:df ('l'!llur~ · ago .
" Whrn n lrgal di~tinetion i~ dt'trrminC'd, a~ no O!W doubt ~ that
it. Illit~· be . brtwP('Il night and day, childhood and matunt~· . or any
otlwr rxtrrme:;, a point ha,.; to b<· fixed or a linP hn" to lw drawn, or
p;raduall~· piekc·d out b~· suect·~~ivP dPcision,.;, to mark whPJ'<' t lw
changr takt·~ plarr. Loohd ;tt by it~df 1\'ithout rPgan[ to tlw nre<>,;:;it~· behind it tlw line or point ;:;c•pm,; arbitrar~ . It might a~ wrfl
or nrarly as wdl br 11 littll' more to onr :sidr or tlw otlwr. But when
it i,.; ~rrn that a line or point thl'rf' mu:;t bP, a nd that tlwr(' i~ no
mathrmatical or logical ,,·a~· of fixin~ it pr<'C'I"<'I~· . tlw ch-ei:swn of
tlw lrgi~laturr mu:;t br arcPptPd 1miP~~ w<• C'<tll ;,;; t ,\ : that it 1" vrry
widr 6f, nn~· rl'a:sonablr mnrk. " IAucisvi/le Gal! ('o v . ('o/ pmrm , ':!.i1
U S. :~':!. , 41 (dis:;pnting)
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Village of Belle Terre
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On Appeal from the United States
et al., Appellants.
Court of Appeals for the Secv.
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• Bruce Boraas et al.

l March -, 1974]
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Belle Terre is a village on Long Island 's north shore
of about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people. Its total
land area is less than one square mile. It has restricted
land use to one-family dwellings excluding lodging
houses, boarding houses. fraternity houses, or multiple
dwelling houses. The word "Family" as used in the
ordinance means, "One or more persons related by blood ,
adoption. or marriage, living and cooking together as a
single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two ( 2)
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit
though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall
be deemed to constitute a family. "
Appellees (Dickmans) are owners of a bouse in the
village and leased it in December. 1971 for a term of 18
months to Michael Truman. Later Bruce Boraas be·
came a colessee. Then Anne Parish moved into the
house along with three others. These six are students
at nearby State University at Stony Brook and none is
related to the other by blood, adoption , or marriage.
When the village served the Dickmans with an "Order to

Rehnqure•

------
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Remedy Yiolations" of tlw ordinance.' the owners plus
thrc<' h'nants ~ thcrC'upon brought this action under
42 F. ~. C'. ~ 108:3 for an injunction declaring the ordinanc<' unCOilstitutional. The District Court held tlw
ordinance unco1tstitutional and tlw ( 'ourt of App<'als
affirnwd. OlH' .i udgc d issrnti ng. 4 7(i F. :.2d HOG. The cas<'
is lwrr by apprral. 28 r. S. C'. ~ 12f)4( 2); and Wl' noted
probabk jurisdiction. 414 l'. :-\. !l07.
This cas<' brings to this C'ourt a different phas<'
of local zoni11g n'gulationi" tha11 \n' lwvr pn•viously
rcviewt>d. 8uclid "· .lml.Jler Neally ('o., :.27'2. P. :-\. ao5.
involved a zoning ordinancP (•lussifying land usC' in a
given area into six catPgories. AppPll<>C''s tracts frll
under thrC'e classifications: C- 2 that includc•d twofamily dwclli11gs; ·e-:3 that includC'd apartments. hotels.
churches. sehools. privatr clubs. hospitals, city hall and
the like; and P -G included Sf'wag<• disposal plants. iiiCinerators, scrap storage. cemeteries. oil and gas storage and
so on. Heights of buildings \\WC' prf'scribt>d for each
zone; also tlw siz<' of la11d areas rPquired for each kind
of usc was specific<!. Tlw land in litigation was vacant
and being held for indus trial dC'velopllWll t; and evide11ce
was introducPd showing that under thP rC'strictcd usc
orclinancf' th<' land \\'Oilld be greatly reduced in value.
Tlw claim was that tlw land ownPr was being deprived
of lihPrty and property without duP process within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Allwndmcnt.
J'owi(Jel' , .. llarris. -Hll lT. S. :~7. ~~ not involved hen· a~ on
Aug. 2, 1972, whm thi~ fecit-raJ ~uit wa~ mitiat!'d, no ~tatP <·a~<· had
br<'n ~tartf'd. Tlw r~l'Prt of tlw "Ordrr to Rrmrd~· Violation~" wa<;
io ,;ubjpet thP or!'npant,.; to liability commf'ncing Augu::;t :3, 1972.
During thP litigatioJl th r lra"e rx pirPd and 1t \\'a >< <•xtPnciPd. Au1w
J'ari,.;h movPd out. TlwrPnftcr tlw oth<'r fivf' "tudE'nb lE'ft and the
0\l'lH'I'>' no\\' hold tlw honw out for :<alE' or rent , including to,
~tud<•nt group::>.
2
Truman , Boraa~ , :md Pari,.;h be<•anw :q>p<'llr<'k but not tlw othe.r
th!'ec.
1
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The Court sustained tlw zoning ordinance under the
police power of the State. saying that the line '\vhich
in this field separates tlw legitilllat<' fron1 the illegitimate
assumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions.' '
272 1'. S., at 387. Anti the Court added "A nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like
a pig in the parlor 1nstead of th~ barnyard. If the
validity of the le~islatlvr clas,.,incatie)ll for zbninlo( put<~
pos<'S be fairly debatabk, thr legislative judgment must
be allowed to control." I d., at ;38H. Th<' Court listed as
consickrations beat•ing ol; th<1 com:titutionality of z:o11ing
ordinances tlw danger of fire or collapse of buildings. the
evils of oVf'r-crowding people>, awl the possibility that
"offensiw trades. industries, and structures" might
"create nuisauce" to n~sidcntial E>t'ctiom:. Ibid. B~lt.
even those historic police power problems need not loom
large or actually be existent in a given case. For the
exclusion of "all industrial establishments" does not mean
that "only offensive or dangerous industries will be excluded ." Ibid. That fact. does not invalidate the ordinance, the Court held :
" ThP inclusion of a reasonable' tnargin to insure
effective enforcement, will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the ~tamp of invalidity. Huch laws may
also find their justificatiOJl in the fact that, in some
fields, the bad fades into the good by such insensible degrees that the two are not capable of being
readily distinguishc>d and separated in terms of
legislation.'' !d., 388- 389.
The main thrust of the case iu the mind of the Court
was in the exclusion of industries aud apartments and as
respects that it com men ted on the desire to keep residential areas free of "disturbing noises"; "increased
traffic" ; the hazard of "moving and parked automobiles";·

't

73-191-0PINION
4

VILLAGE

m

HELLE TEmn; u. BOHAAS

the ' 1depriving children of the privilege of quiet aud
open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored
localities. " /d., at 0~)4. The ordinance was sanctioned
because the validity of the legislative classification was
"fairly debatable" and therefore could not be said to be
wholly arbitrary. !d., at S88.
Our decision in Berman \', Parker, 348 r. s. 26. SUS·
taitwd a land use pro.lect in the District of Columbia
against a land owner's claim that the taking violated the
Dur Process ClausE' and thP Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Tjw essencE' of the argument
against the law >vas. while taking property for ridding
an area of slums was permissible. taking it ' 1merely to
develop a better balanced. more attractive community"
was not. 348 P. R.. at 31. We rdused to limit the concept of public welfare that may be enhauced by wning
regulations." W0 said:
1

Miserable and disruptablr housing conditions may
tlo more than spread disease and crime and immo·
rality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle.
They may indeed make living an almost unsufferable
burden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight
on the community which robs it of charm. which
makes it a place from which men turn. The misery
'

:< VPrmont hm; etJacted c·omprdwn~ivr ~tatrwidr land 118<' controb
whiC"b dirrct loC"a! board~ to drvrlop plan~ ordPrillg the u~r~ of local
lnnd inter alia. to "crPatc· condition:; favorable to tmn~portation,
hc·alth, "afl't~·, civic aetivitie::; and educational and cultural opportn nit ir". j"nlld] rrduer t lw wa~t l'~ of finn ncial and lmma n rr~ourre~
which rc·~ult from rit hrr rxer~~ivr eonge~1 ion or rxet•ssivr scattrring
of population . . . . " 10 \'ermont Stat. Ann. § 6042 (1971 Supp.).
FPdt>ral lrgi~lation ha~ bren proposed de;:;ignl'd to a::;::;i::;t Statr;:; and
lomli1ir~-; ill drv<'loping ~ueh broad objectivr land u::;r guidrlinrs.
Srr S. C'omm. on l11trrior and Immlar Affair~, Land U;:;e Policy and
Planning A~~i~tance Act , S. HPp. No . 9'3-Hl'7,, 93c[ Cong., l;:;t Sc~s.
'(1D73),
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of housing may despoil a community as a11 open
sewer may ruin a river.
"We do not sit to determine whether a particular
housing project is or is not desirable. The concept
of the public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . .
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within
the power of the legislature to determine that th~
community should be beautiful as well as he'althy,
spacious as well as clean, ~·ell-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled." f d., 32-:33.
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If the ordinance segregated onc area only for one race,

it would immediately be suspect under the reasoning of
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 e. S. GO, where the Court
invalidated a city ordinance barring a Black from acquiring· real property in a white rE>sidPntial area by reason of'
au 1866 Act of Congress, 14. Stat. 27. 42 U. S. C. ~ 1982
and an 1870 Act. 16 Stat. 144, both enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., 78-82. See Jones \". Mayer
Co., 302 P. S. 409.
In Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberye, 278 e. S. 116. Seattle
had a wning ordinance that permitted a "philanthropic
homc for children or for old people'' in a particular rlistrict
"when the written COlJSent shall have been obtained of
the owners of two thirds of thc property v. ·ithin four
hundred feet of the propose-d building. " ld. , at 118.
The Court held that provision of th<> ordinance unconstitutional saying that the existing owncrs could "withhold
consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily, and may subject
the trustee I owner] to their will or caprice." I d., at 122.
Unlike thc billboard cases (Cusack Co . "· City of Chicago,
242 U. S. 526). the Court concluded that the Seattle ordinance was invalid since thc proposcd home for the aged
poor was not showu by its maintenanC(' and construction
"to work a11y injury , inconvPnience. or annoyancf' to the
community . the district or any pen;on ," Id ., at 122.
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The present ordinance is challenged on several grounds:
that it interferes with a person's right to travel; that it
interff'res with the right to migrate to and settle within a
State; that it bars people '1-vho are uncongenial to the
present residents: that the ordinance expresses the social
preferences of the residents for groups that will be coilgenial to them; that social homogenity is not a legitimate
interest of government; that the restriction of those
whom the neighbors do not like trenches on the newconwr's rights of privacy; that it is of no rightful couccm
to villagers whether the residents are married or unmarried; that the ordinance is antitlwtical to the Nation's
experience, ideology and self-perception as an ope11,
egalitarian. and integrated society 1
\Ve find none of these reasons in the record before us.
~ It is not aimed at transients. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 F. S. o18. It involvPs 110 procedural disparity
inflicted on some but not on others I"Uch as was presented
by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 F. R. 12. It involves no "fundamental'' right guaranteed by the Constitution. such as
voting. Harper v. Virginia Board, 083 U.S. 663; the right
of association . .YAACP v. Alabama, 357 V. S. 44n; the
right of access to the courts, XAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415; or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 r. S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438.
WP deal with Pconomic and social legislation where legislatures have historically drawn lines which we respect
against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection
Clause "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 F . R. 420. 425426; Reed V. Reed, 404 r. S. 71. 76.
lt is said. however, that if two unmarried people can
constitute a "family," there is no reason why three or
:\Ian~· rdPr<:'llC'P~ in tlw ckV<'Iopnwnt of th1~ th<:'~Js an• mnd<:' to
Turrwr, Th<:' Frontier in AmNican Histor~· ( HJ:ZO) , with rmphnsttl
on his th<:'ory thttt "drmocrarr i~ hom of fn•<• Janel. '' ld , ;32.
1
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four may not. But every line drawn by a legislature
leaves some out that might well have been included.;
That exercise of diseretiou, however, is a legislative not
a judicial function.
lt is said that the Belle Terre ordinance reeks with an
animosity to unmarried couples who live together.
1'here is no evidence to support it; and the provision of
1
the ordinance bringiug within the definitiou of a "family'
two Unmarried peoplti bPlies the charge.
· The ordinanee placPs no ban on freedout of associatiou.
for a "family'' may. so far as the ordinallce is cOncerned,
C'ntertaitl whomever thtly lik(l.
The regimrs of boarding houses. fraternity houses, and
the like present urban problrms. More people oecupy a
givrn space; more carR rathrr continuously pass by; morC'
cars are parked; noise travels with crowds.
A quiet place when' yards are wide. pC'oplc few. aud
motor vehicles restrictrd are legitimate guiclelitH'S iu a
land use project addressed to fantily nfleds. This goal is
a permissible one within Berma11 \'. Parker, supra. Thr
police power is not confined to elimination of filth. steuch,
and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where
family values. youth values. and the blessings of quiet
seclusion, and clean air lltake the area a sanctuary for
people.

Reversed.

r, l\fr . .fu~iicr HolmP~ mndr thl' point a llitlf r<·nttu·~· ag;o.
''When a IP~J;HI di~tinction i~ drtPrmined, a~ no onr doubt~ that
it. ma~· br. betwrPn nig;ht am! day, childhood and matunt~ ·. or nny
othrr rxtrrme~, n point has to lw fixrd or 11 linP ha" to lw drawn , or
p:raduall~· picked out b~· ~ll<'l'l'~"ivr dPei~ion~, to mark when• tfw
l'hangr takp~ plHC'<'. Look<'d at by it~elf without rrg;nrd to tlw n<'<'<'l:';;it~· behind it tlw line or point "<'C'lll~ f!l'bitntr). It might as wefl
or nrarly as wrll be a littlr morr to onr "idP or thr otlwr. But whC'n
it is "f'<'n that a !me or point thrrr mu::;t b<•. and that thrrP is no
mntfwnwtical or logiritl wa)· of fixing it preri ::iel~·. tlw d<·ci::;wn of
tlw lPgi~laturr mu:st be accepted un!Ps" we ran ::;ay thnt it ~~ vrry
.widr iiL an~· rra:sonabl<· marie" Lotti11ville Gas ('o . v. ('o/eman, '!.77
U S. :Q, 41 (di::il'Pnting)
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 11, 1974

Re: No. 73-191, Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas

..
Dear Bill,

(._'

I am glad to join your opinion for the Court
in this case.

("J.

••

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Douglas
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Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST
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March 11, 1974

Re:

No. 73-191 - Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your opinion for the Court in this
case.
Sincerely, ~

Vv

Mr. Justice Douglas
Copies to the Conference
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Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Douglas
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Dear Bill:
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Please join me.
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Mr. Justice Douglas
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Village of Belle Terre
On Appeal from the United States
et al., Appellants.
Court of Appeals for the Secv.
oml Circuit.
Bruce Boraas et al.
r-.March -, 1974]

MR. JUS'l'ICB DouGLAS uelivered the opinion of the
Court.
Belle Terre is a village on Long Island 's north shore
of about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people. Its total
land area is less than one square mile. It has restricted
land use to one-family dwellings excluding lodging
houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple
dwelling houses. The word "Family" as used i11 the
ordinance means, "One or more persons related by blood.
adoption , or marriage, living and cooking together as a
single housekeeping unit. exclusive of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2)
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit
though not related by blood. adoption , or marriage shall
be deemed to constitute a family ."
Appellees (Dickmans) are owners of a house in the
village and leased it in December. 1971 for a term of 18
months to Michael Truman. LatRr Bruce Boraas became a colessee. Then Anne Parish moved into the
house along with three others. These six are students
at nearby State University at Stony Brook and none is
related to the other by blood. adoption , or marriage.
When the village served the Dick.mans with an "Order to
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Remedy Violations" of the ordinance,, the owuers plus
three tenants~ thereupon brought this action under
42 U. S. C. ~ 1983 for an injunction declaring the ordinance unconstitutional. The District Court held the
ordinance unconstitutional and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. one judge dissl'nting. 476 F. 2d 80ti. The case
is here by appeeal. 28 r. S. C. ~ 1254(2); and we noted
probable jurisdiction. 414 U. S. 907.
This case brings to this Court a different phase
of local zoning regulations than we have previously
reviewed. Euclid Y. Ambler Realty ('o., 272 U. S. 365,
involved a zoning ordinance classifying land use in a
given area into six categories. Appellee's tracts fell
under three classificatioiJs: U-2 that incluJed twofamily dwellings; U-3 that included apartments, hotels,
churches. schools. private clubs, hospitals. city hall and
the like; and U-6 included sewage disposal plants. incinerators, scrap storage. cemeteries, oil and gas storage and
so on. Heights of buildings werP prescribed for each
zone; also the size of land areas required for each kind
of use was specified. The land in litigatiou was vacaut
and being held for industrial developme11t; and evidence
was introduced showing that uuder the restricted use
ordinance the land would be greatly reduced in value.
The claim was that the land owner was being deprived
of liberty and property without due process within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1 Younger v. Ilarri:s, -WI U. S. 3i. i~ not involved lwre a~ on
Aug. 2, 19i2, when thi,- frdrral ~uit wa~ initiated, no ~tate' ca~e had
bern ~tnrted. Thr rffPrt of t-lw "Ordrr to Hrmrdy Violation~" wns
to subject the occupant~ to linbility romm<'ncing August 3, 1972.
During the litigation the lea>'<' expirc•d and it wa::: rxtencled. Amw
Pari:sh moved out. Thercaftrr the othrr fivp students left and the
ownrr~ now hold the home out for ~ale or r<>nt, inrhtcliJtg to,
student groups.
2
Truman, })orna:s, and Parish hecaroc l!l)pellecs but not the other
three.
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The Court sustained the zoning ordinance under the
police power of the State. saying that the line "which
in this field separates the legitimate fro111 the illegitimate
assumption of power is not capabk of precise <!~limita
tion. It varies with circumstances and colldititms."
~72 e. S .. at !387. And the Court added "A nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong plac<'.-like
a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. Jf the
validity of tlw lcgishitiv<' clasf'ification for zoning pur~
poses be fairly dc>batable. the legislatiw judgment must
be allowed to control.'' !d., at :3RR The Court list(•rl as
consideratiotls bt->at•ing on the constitutionality ?f zoning
ordinances tlw danger of fire or eollap~e of buildings. the
evils of over-crowding people. and the possibility that
"offensiv<' trades. industries. and structures" might
1
'create nuisanec' ' to residential sections. Ibid. But
even those historic police power problems need not loom
large or actually be existent in a given case. For the
exclusion of "all industrial establishments'' does not mean
that "only offensive or dangerous industriPs will be excluded.'' Ibid. That fact does not invalidate the ordihance, the Court held :
"The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure
effective enforcement, will not put upon a law. otherwise valid. the stamp of invalidity. Such laws may
also find their justification in the fact that, in some
fields. the bad fades into the good hy such insensible degrees that the two art' not capable of being
readily distinguished and separated in terms of
legislation. ' ' !d. , 388- 38D
The main thrust of tlw case in the mind of the Court
was in the exclusion of imlustrics and apartments and as
respects that it commented on the desire to keep residential areas free of "disturbing noises" ; "increased
traffic"; the hazard of "moving and parked automobiles" j

'.

•,
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tl1e "depriving childrcn of thc privilege of quiet and
open spaces for play. enjoyed by those in more favored
localities." /d., at 304. The ordinance was sanctioned
because the validity of th<> legislative classification was
"fairly debatable'' and therefore could not be said to be
wholly arbitrary. ld., at 388.
Our decision in Berman Y. Parker, 348 'U. S. 26, sus•
'tained a land use project in the District of Columbia
against a ·land owner's claim that the taking violated th·e
Due Process Clausc and tlw Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 'Che PSt-<encc of tlw argument
against tht' law wa1". while taking propf'rty for ridding
an area of slums was permissible. taking it " merely to
develop a better balanced. more attractive community"
was not. 348 r. S.. at 31. We refus<>d to limit the concept of public welfare that may be enhaHced by zoning
regulations." We said:
"Miserable and disruptahle housing conrlitions may
do more than spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocatP the spirit by reducing the people \~v· ho live then' to the status of cattle.
·They may indeed make living an al mo~t unsufferable
burden. They may also bP an ugly sore. a blight
on the community which robs it of charm. which
makes it a place from which men turn. The misery
3 VPrmont ha;; <•nadPd eompn•hc·n~iv<· l:it:ttPwid<> land u•r ront rol~
which direct local board~ to ckv<'lop pl<ln~ ordrrin~ th<' u~<':o of loclil
land intel' alia. to '· crPal<' condition;~ favorahiP to tran~ portation ,
health , :oafrty, eivic aetivitie~ and edueatioual and cultmal opportuniti<'~ . I and] rPcluce the wastP~ of finanewl <llld human rP~Olli'<'P~
which re~ult from ritlwr ('XCe~:;iv<' eo ngl'~tw n or ('X Ces~ ive :;ra ttrrin~
of population . ... " 10 Y<·rmont Stat . Ann. § (i042 (1971 Supp.).
Federal lcgi;dation ha~ b!'Pil propo~!'d d<•:;ig;nPcl to a~si~t Stat!'~ and
localitic,; in d<'vPioping ~uch broad ohj<•rtiv<' land u:o!' guidPiin!',;.
SeeS. Comm. ou Intf'rior and In~ular Affair~ , Land Use Policy and
Planning A~si~ tancc Act, S. n PJL No. 9:~- Hli, 9:3d C'ong., bt Se::;:; ,

(1973).
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of housing may despoil a community as aH open
sewer may ruin a river.
"We do not sit to determine whether a particular
housing project is or is not desirable. The concept
of the public welfarr is broad and inc] usive. . . •
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within
the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should he beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious aR well as clean. well-balanced as 'Wt'll as
carefully patrolled. " /d ., 32-33.

If the ordinance segregated one area only for one race,
it would immediately be suspect under the reasoning of
B 'uchanan v. Warley, 245 P. H. 60. where the Court
invalidated a rity ordinance barring a Black from acquiring real property in a whitr reside11 tial area by reason of
an 1866 Act of Congress. 14 Stat. '27. 42 U. S. C. ~ 1982
and an 1870 Act, 16 Stat. 144. both enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. /d. , 78-82. ::;ee Jones \', Mayer
Co., 392 u. S. 40n.
In Seattle Trust Co. ,., Rvl)erge, 278 F. S. 116, Seattle
had a zoning ordinancE> that permitted a "philanthropic
home for children or for old peopk" in a particular district
"when the written consent shall have been obtained of
the owners of two thirds of the property within four
hundred feet of the proposed building." !d. , at 118.
The Court held that provision of the ordinance unconstitutional saying that the existing owners could "withhold
consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily, and may subject
the trustee l owner J to their will or caprice." I d. , at 122.
Unlike the billboard cases (Cusack Co., .. City of Chicago,
242 U.S. 526) . the Court C'Onclucled that thf' Seattlf' ordinance was in valid sine<> the proposed home for the agrd
poor was not ~howu by its maintenanee and cm1struction
"to work any i11j ury, in con Vl'llif'llC<'. or annoyance to the
community, the distriC't or any pcrsou ." /d., at 122.
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The present ordinance is challenged on several grounds:
that it interferes with a person's right to travel; that it
interferes with the right to migrate to and settle within a
State; that it bars people who are uncougenial to the
present residents; that the ordinance expresses the social
preferences of the residents for groups that will be congenial to them; that social homogenity is not a legitimate
interest of government; that the restriction of those
whom the neighbors do not like trenches on the newcomer's rights of privacy; that it is of no rightful concern
to villagers whether the residents are married or unmarried; that the ordinance is antithetical to the Nation's
experience, ideology and self-perception as an open',
egalitarian, allCr integra ted SOCiety, I
We find none of these reasons in the record before us~
It is not aimed at transients. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U. S. 618. It involves no procedural disparity
inflicted on some but not on others such as was presented
by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 P. S. 12. It iuvolves no "fundamental" right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as
voting, Hm·per v. Viryinia Board, 3831J. S. 663; the right
of association, .VAACP Y. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; the
tight of access to the courts, ;\"AACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
4:15; or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438,
453-454. We deal ·with economic and social legislation
where legislatures have historically drawn lines which
we respect against the charge of violation of the Equal
Protection Clause if thf' law be "reasonable. not arbitrary" (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415) and bears "a rational relationship to a .[perMany rrferrner~ in tlw rlrwlopmrnt of tin~ tlH'i:<J~ arr 11\adr to
Turner, Thr Frontirr in Amrrican llistor~· ( 19:20), with Pmphasis
011 hi;; theory (hat ''dl'll10('1"HC)" IS born of fn'<' JaJuf '' /d., a:! .
4
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inissible] state objective."

7

Reed v. Reed, 40'4 U. 8. 71 , }

76.
It is said, however, that if two unmarried people can
constitute a "family," there is no reason why three or
four may not. But every line drawn by a legislature
leaves some out that might well have been included. 5
That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative not
a judicial function.
It is said that the Belle Terre ordinance reeks with an
animosity to unmarried couples who live togethf'r.
There is no evideiwe to support it; and the i)r6vision of
the ordinance bringing within thP definition Of 11 "family;'
two unmarried pPoplc~ belies the charge.
The ordinance places no ban on freedonl of association ,
for a "family'' may, so far as the ordinallce i13 coucer11ed ,
entertaih whomever they like.
The regimes of boarding houses. fratertlity houses. a11tl
the like present urban problems. More people occupy a
given space; more cars rather continuously pass by; more
cars are parked; noise travels with crowds.
A quiet place where yards are wide. people few. alltl
motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a,
land use project addressed to family needs. This goal is
"Mr. Ju~tice Holnw:s mad<:> tll(' point a half ('('lltur~· ago .
"When a legal di~tinrtton 1::; dC'termim•d, a ~ no onC' douhts th11t
it. may br, between night and da~· . childhood and maturity. or any
other extreme~, a point hn:> to bC' fixed or a line hn ~ to br drawn , or
graduall~· pirked out b~· :surr<:>~:sive deci~ion:s, to mark whrre the
change takr~ plarr. Looked at by it:srlf without rrgard to the twcr~ 
sity behind it the line or point ::; C'em~ arlHtrary . It might a;; wrll
or n<:>arly as well be a litt!C' morr to one sidr or the othrr. But when
it is seen that a lim• or point there muHt be, and that there i~ no
mat.hematical or logiral wa~· of fixing it prrri~rly , thr deei~ion of
the lcgi:slntnrr mutit Le acccptt>d tml~~ we rail :say that it i:s very
widr of any rrat~onahlr mark ." Louisville Gas Co . v. ('olemau, '277
U. S. 32, 41 (di~:scnting) .

\

i
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a permissible one within Berman v. Parker, supra. The
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench,
and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people.
Reversed,

j)nvrnm C,!Jourl ttf tlft ~ttittlt .itatt.&

Jiaglfhtghttt. !D. QJ. 2ll,?'!.;l
CHAMBERS Of'

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR.

RE: No. 73-191

March 13, 1974

Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas

Dear Bill:
I have not yet decided whether I'll
write a dissent but will make up my mind
within the next week.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Douglas
cc: The Conferencd

.'
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~u.prtlttt

Q)'om·t of tltt ~tttt~ll ~taULl
10~:tSitinghttt, ~. (Q:. 2llgt'l-.;l

CHAMBERS OF

March 14, 1974

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

I

Re: No. 73-191 --Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas

Dear Bill:
I, too, will need a little more time on this
one.
Sincerely,

Cffi·r
T.M.
Mr. Justice Douglas
cc: The Conference

I

.iupr.tmt <lf4Uttt .of tlrt 'Jnittb' .ita:tt•
'Jil'ulrhtghm. J. <q. 20?'i~
·
CHAMI!IEFIS 01'"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

March 18, 1974

Re: 73-191 - Village of Belle Terre - v. Boraas

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Douglas
Copi es to the Conference '
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